Veto Power Abuse: Reforming UNSC Decision-Making Without Charter Amendment

This paper investigates the impact of veto power abuse on the United Nations Security Councils (UNSC) ability to achieve the objectives outlined in the UN Charter, particularly the maintenance of international peace and security. It argues that the Councils persistent dysfunction stems less from its membership structure than from the strategic misuse of veto power by its five permanent members (P5). Through legal interpretation, institutional analysis, and comparative case studies, the paper demonstrates that the veto has evolved from a collective safeguard into a political instrument that obstructs accountability and impedes humanitarian responses. Drawing on Articles 27(3), 31, 34, and 35 of the UN Charter, the study clarifies common misconceptions about membership inclusivity and shows that procedural participation is already available without structural expansion. It critically evaluates the limitations of expanding permanent membership and instead proposes institutional reforms that do not require Charter amendments. These include strengthening General Assembly oversight under Resolution 76/262, establishing a Veto Accountability Index, and restricting veto use in mass atrocity contexts. This paper ultimately contends that targeted, non-Charter-based reforms are not only more politically feasible but also essential to restoring the UNSCs credibility and effectiveness in a rapidly evolving global order.