Modeling False Data Injection Attacks in Integrated Electricity-Gas Systems

Integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs) rely heav-ily on communication systems and are vulnerable to cyberattacks. In order to gain insights into intruders behavior and design tailored detection and mitigation methods, this paper studies the modeling of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on IEGSs. First, we design a tailored static state estimation model and a bad data detection method for IEGSs. Then, we develop FDIAs on IEGSs with complete network topology and parameter information and give conditions for ensuring the stealthiness of these FDIAs. Par-ticularly, the FDIAs consider the cyberattack interdependency caused by power-gas coupling facilities. Next, we develop FDIAs on IEGSs when intruders have only local network topology and parameter information of an IEGS. At last, we explore FDIAs on IEGSs when intruders have only local network topology infor-mation of an IEGS and mathematically prove the existence of FDIAs, specifically targeting gas compressors. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed FDIAs on IEGSs with both complete and incomplete network information.