Evolutionary analysis of the acquisition methods of power batteries by new energy vehicle manufacturers

Purpose As the core component of new energy vehicles, power batteries are directly related to the market competitiveness of manufacturers. This study explores how manufacturers can develop effective power battery acquisition strategies to cope with cost pressures and maintain competitive advantage against the dual background of increasing industry competition and withdrawal of government subsidies. Design/methodology/approach A Stackelberg game model involving two manufacturers and third-party suppliers and an evolutionary game model for the manufacturers under different strategies are constructed. Simulation analysis explores how factors like R&D investment cost and consumer attention influence strategy choices. Findings The results show that when the success rate of R&D is high, manufacturers tend to choose independent R&D as a stable strategy despite the need to invest more costs. In the case of a low R&D success rate, third-party procurement becomes the manufacturer’s preferred choice, but as the third-party input cost coefficient rises or the independent R&D input cost falls, independent R&D will become the manufacturer’s stable strategy choice again. In addition, when the rise rate of consumer attention factors significantly exceeds the success rate of research and development, manufacturers will tend to choose third-party procurement strategies. Originality/value This study innovatively explores the acquisition methods of power batteries for new energy vehicles from the dual perspectives of subsidy cancellation and market competition. The constructed model scientifically integrates the two key factors of battery endurance and price competition, realizes theoretical innovation and provides a new perspective and theoretical support for the manufacturer’s strategy selection.