Did Wittgenstein adopt a logically Ideal and Perfect Language which has its own properties?

Since 1960s up today there were many doubts about Wittgenstein's adoption of logically perfect and ideal language. R. Bernstein (1966), for example, claimed that the idea of an ideal language was a myth which had been created by B. Russell, while Dale Jacquette (2017) claimed that Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism which had been adopted by the earlier Wittgenstein did not need an ideal language. On the other hand, some philosophers tried to take a middle position by claiming that Wittgenstein did not in fact adopt an ideal language as far as adopted a notation of ideas. In this paper I would examine these interpretations on the background of Wittgenstein's texts and his intellectual development demonstrating three things: 1) that Wittgenstein did adopt a symbolic ideal notation. 2) And it is not only notation, but it is also an ideal language, which means that the earlier Wittgenstein did adopt an ideal language even if he abandoned it later. 3) Finally, the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of this language could be determined positively in contrast to the passive determinations. Thus we can suppose that the absence of determining for these positive properties is the main cause which lead the Wittgenstein's interpreters of claiming his not adoption to an ideal language. Otherwise, their determination would support his adoption.