“Both causal and free” or “Not only causal, but also free”? Two routes of compatibilist thinking

Abstract Current compatibilism concerning free will is divided in two major camps, defining freedom either (a) as a state of harmony or a process of formation between distinct levels of human desires, or (b) as an agent’s access and responsiveness to reasons. Referring to modern as well as classical sources, I argue that the split between these approaches may go along with divergent metaphysical interpretations of their shared compatibilist commitment. Most importantly, while “desire theories” are apt to comply with the basic claim that human behaviour can be both causal and free , “reason theories” are capable of fulfilling the stricter requirement that free agency be not only causal , but also free . Given that the latter formula demands some noncausal element being involved in free will, I investigate under which conditions reasons can figure as such noncausal entities, and discuss how attractive the ensuing version of reason compatibilism is.