The Role of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the role of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in the “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will reconstruct Kant’s conception of the PSR, drawing from his lectures on logic and the Second Analogy of Experience. Kant distinguished a formal and a material version of this principle. In both cases, the PSR enables the attribution of actuality to propositions (in the case of the logical principle) or objects (in the case of the real principle). However, it will be essential to note that real actuality (existence) cannot be attributed to an object without reference to a possible empirical intuition. Second, I will show that keeping in mind this restriction, which sets the conditions to attribute existence to objects, is essential to understand Kant’s general argument in the Antinomy. In this context, it will be necessary to distinguish between the PSR and the supreme principle of reason. Whereas the former principle is a necessary rule for the possibility of experience, this is not true regarding the latter principle. Third, I will show that the supreme principle is a rule meant to satisfy reason’s logical maxim.