Legal Autonomy vs. Political Dependency: The Role of Prosecutorial Power in Corruption Investigations

This study aims to analyze the tension between legal autonomy and political dependency in shaping prosecutorial power and its effectiveness in corruption investigations. This study employs a narrative review method using descriptive analysis, drawing from peer-reviewed academic literature, international legal reports, and comparative case studies published between 2020 and 2025. The material covers various jurisdictions to examine structural differences in prosecutorial independence, appointment mechanisms, oversight structures, and political interference. Sources include theoretical discussions, legal analyses, and empirical findings that reflect global variations in the prosecution of corruption cases. The review finds that prosecutorial autonomy is a critical factor in the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Countries with strong legal and institutional safeguards—such as transparent appointments, fixed terms, and operational independence—exhibit higher rates of successful prosecutions and greater public trust. In contrast, jurisdictions with high political dependency demonstrate selective justice, delayed investigations, and diminished institutional credibility. The chilling effect of political pressure on prosecutorial discretion is a recurring theme, particularly in systems with weak legal protections. Public trust, media oversight, and international monitoring mechanisms serve as important buffers against political interference but vary in effectiveness depending on local contexts. Prosecutorial independence is essential for maintaining the integrity of anti-corruption enforcement. Effective reform requires balancing legal autonomy with institutional accountability, adapting oversight frameworks to national contexts, and reinforcing public trust in legal institutions. Long-term success depends on the resilience of both legal frameworks and democratic norms.