Constitutional Amendments, Democratic Resilience, and the Threat of Political Regime Change

Constitutional Law No. 422/2020, as published in the Collection of Laws (Coll.), effective January 1, 2021, prohibited the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic from reviewing the conformity of constitutional laws with the Constitution. This overturned the Court’s 2019 Finding (PL. ÚS 21/2014) and effectively transferred the status of the sole constitution-giver from the people to the Parliament. The Slovak Constitution, one of the most flexible in Europe, now faces heightened risks of arbitrary amendment, raising concerns about constitutional weakness and democratic resilience. This article situates the Slovak case within the global debate on unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the balance between legislative power and judicial review. It examines how Slovakia’s experience illustrates the vulnerabilities of flexible constitutional frameworks and their implications for the stability of democratic regimes.