On the moral (in)equivalence of human embryos and stem cell-derived embryo models

Gyngell <i>et al</i> argue that no intrinsic differences exist between stem cell-derived embryo models (SCEMs) and embryos derived from fertilisation that would justify attributing a higher moral status to the latter. Consequently, they claim there is no ethical rationale for treating SCEMs differently from embryos and contend that endorsing SCEMs as having moral advantages over embryos constitutes an obfuscation. In this commentary, we challenge the assertion that human SCEMs and embryos are morally equivalent by painting a more nuanced picture of the moral value of (different kinds of) SCEMs and embryos. First, we highlight the diversity among SCEMs, noting that different types of SCEMs need not be morally equivalent. This point is illustrated by taking a closer look at their potentiality, a property often considered relevant to moral status. Second, we observe that Gyngell <i>et al</i>, like much of the broader debate, primarily concentrate on the direct moral status of SCEMs in their analysis of the moral (in)equivalence with embryos. We argue that a comprehensive moral evaluation should encompass different types of moral value, evaluating not only direct moral status but also relational, symbolic and instrumental value. Ultimately, we suggest that the real obfuscation lies not in endorsing SCEMs as having moral advantages over embryos but rather in the overemphasis on direct moral status and the binary thinking about the moral (in)equivalence of embryos versus SCEMs that dominates these discussions.