Prospect Theory, Groupthink, and Amplified Frames of Loss: Making Sense of Russia's Decision to Invade Ukraine

Abstract Russia's invasion of Ukraine entails extreme political risks for the Kremlin. The article explores how the decision to invade Ukraine, taken by Putin and his core group of advisers, can be explained. Focusing on psychological approaches to foreign policy, the article integrates prospect theory and groupthink perspectives. The argument is that groupthink tends to amplify risk-taking frames in the domain of loss, making frame reversal unlikely. The case study first traces indications of how Putin and his core group accommodated the annexation of Crimea and increasingly framed the situation in the loss domain, which resulted in dispositions for high-risk behavior. The case study then explores how individual dispositions towards risk-taking aggregated into a group-level decision by amplifying the negative frame about the nature of the problem. The findings help us understand a decision that will affect the European order and illustrate the virtues and limits of psychological foreign policy approaches.