Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting

The short-selling of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) creates “phantom” ETF shares, trading at market prices, with cash flow rights but no associated voting rights. Unlike regular ETF shares backed by underlying securities, which are voted as directed by the ETF sponsor, phantom ETF shares are typically hedged by the underlying basket as part of market-making activities and result in a significant number of sidelined votes of underlying securities. We find that increases in phantom shares for the corresponding underlying securities are associated with decreases in the number of proxy votes cast and increases in broker nonvotes. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01567 .

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Publication Details

Journal
Management Science
Published
2025-05-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01567
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting

Rabih Moussawi, Richard B. Evans, Michael Young, Oğuzhan Karakaş
2 citations
Management Science
Corporate Finance and Governance
article

Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting

Rabih Moussawi, Richard B. Evans, Michael Young, Oğuzhan Karakaş
article en
2 citations

Abstract

The short-selling of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) creates “phantom” ETF shares, trading at market prices, with cash flow rights but no associated voting rights. Unlike regular ETF shares backed by underlying securities, which are voted as directed by the ETF sponsor, phantom ETF shares are typically hedged by the underlying basket as part of market-making activities and result in a significant number of sidelined votes of underlying securities. We find that increases in phantom shares for the corresponding underlying securities are associated with decreases in the number of proxy votes cast and increases in broker nonvotes. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01567 .

Management ScienceVol. 72(2)
University of Cambridge (GB), University of Virginia (US), University of Missouri (US), Villanova University (US), University of Pennsylvania (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 84%
Corporate Finance and Governance
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