Expertise, signaling and learning in fish auctions

In sequential auctions for identical goods, theory predicts that prices follow a martingale. Using over 12 million transactions spanning 28 years of Dutch auctions at the Sydney Fish Market, we document two findings. First, prices follow an inverted-U pattern: they rise in the first three rounds and then decline. Second, this pattern is driven by the experience of the first bidder. When an experienced bidder wins the first crate, subsequent prices rise — other bidders treat the experienced bidder’s price as a credible signal of lot value. When an inexperienced bidder wins first, prices fall immediately. We present a simple model of asymmetric information that rationalizes both facts: in equilibrium, an expert’s bid reveals information about lot value, inducing uninformed bidders to bid higher in subsequent rounds.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107814
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
article
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article

Expertise, signaling and learning in fish auctions

Isa Emin Hafalir, Ali Vergili
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Auction Theory and Applications
article

Expertise, signaling and learning in fish auctions

Isa Emin Hafalir, Ali Vergili
article en

Abstract

In sequential auctions for identical goods, theory predicts that prices follow a martingale. Using over 12 million transactions spanning 28 years of Dutch auctions at the Sydney Fish Market, we document two findings. First, prices follow an inverted-U pattern: they rise in the first three rounds and then decline. Second, this pattern is driven by the experience of the first bidder. When an experienced bidder wins the first crate, subsequent prices rise — other bidders treat the experienced bidder’s price as a credible signal of lot value. When an inexperienced bidder wins first, prices fall immediately. We present a simple model of asymmetric information that rationalizes both facts: in equilibrium, an expert’s bid reveals information about lot value, inducing uninformed bidders to bid higher in subsequent rounds.

Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationVol. 252
University of Technology Sydney (AU), Macquarie University (AU)
Auction Theory and Applications
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