The impact of heterogeneous preferences on multi-issue repeated social dilemma games with correlated strategy in structured populations

Individuals frequently engage in a multitude of concurrent games. Owing to the complexity of the interactions and the inherent diversity in players' preferences, this paper introduces a multi-issue game model tailored for structured populations characterized by heterogeneous preferences. The model incorporates several dimensions of preference diversity, including the relative weight accorded to different games, and the form of preference and distribution patterns within the population. Through numerical experiments, we reveal that structured populations foster cooperation in the context of two-issue repeated social dilemma games. Two predominant preference distribution patterns are compared. The first assumes a random uniform distribution, implying that preferences are distributed evenly across the population. The second is a special distribution, in which players with similar preferences are more likely to form clusters or groups. Our findings underscore that when preferences carry equal weight across the two games, cooperation flourishes most robustly. Furthermore, the binary forms of preference and the excessive variance of preferences in the populations both hinder the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behaviors. Notably, when delving into the impact of preference distributions, we discern that special distributions are less conducive to cooperation compared to their uniform distributions. Overall, this study enriches our comprehension of cooperative phenomena in complex, multi-dimensional gaming scenarios by incorporating heterogeneous preferences. • A multi-issue repeated game model in structured populations with heterogeneous preferences is proposed. • Structured populations can promote cooperation on two-issue repeated social dilemma games. • Heterogeneous preferences can jeopardize cooperation. • Insufficient numbers and excessive variance in preference types both hinder cooperation.