Relations, Communing, and Intuitions

I respond to Metz’s A Relational Moral Theory by raising some concerns with his account of ‘rightness as friendliness’ both as a moral theory and in relation to its supposed Africanness, as well as by suggesting some places where it could be clarified. I argue that his account of moral status as based on the capacity for friendship is more individualist than the accounts with which he compares it. Distinguishing between an account of what grounds value and an account of how we ought to act, I question whether a capacity-based ground of moral status can be equated with an account of rightness as friendliness. I argue further, that Metz builds values into his account of true friendliness, rather than showing that they are grounded in it. I then question the role of the sixteen intuitions he appeals to both in supporting his theory and in establishing its Africanness, and argue that it is based on simplified, homogenized and romanticized accounts of both Africa and the so-called west, as well as not treating like with like in the comparison.