Neconcordanțe teoretico-practice ale sprijinului logistic în lupta pentru cucerirea Kievului

In the initial stage of the invasion of Ukraine, logistic support for Russian forces faced major difficulties. Although the Russian Armed Forces’ logistic doctrine outlines a robust capacity to support forces, in practice, poor execution of logistic support led to operational failures. In this article, we will highlight the aspects that contributed to Russia’s inability to logistically support its own forces in the fight for the conquest of Kyiv. Thus, we will examine theoretical elements regarding the conception and organization of material-technical support structures and will detail practical aspects observed in the execution of logistic support for Russian troops. The purpose of the article is to highlight the discrepancies between the theoretical aspects and the execution of logistic support for the Russian forces that fought in the battle for Kyiv. The authors aim to justify that planning and logistic estimates during the battle for Kyiv did not adhere to relevant doctrinal directions, which contributed to military failures. As for the employed research method, we opted for content analysis of data extracted from military specialties books, doctrines, and publications in the field of military sciences, as well as from the NATO collection of lessons identified on the Russian-Ukrainian front.