Corporate Lobbying in Parliament: Operationalization and Assessment PossibilitiesExemplified by USA and Russia

Lobbying studies are common in political science and economics, but only a few works are devoted to assessing a bill’s lobbying potential. Empirical verification of theoretical judgments seems to be a logical continuation of discussions on lobbying. This article proposes a tool for assessing the lobbying potential of legislative initiatives, tested on real cases: a methodology combining quantitative and qualitative indicators, official and expert data. We tested it using comparative legal and statistical analysis, and expert estimations for two national cases: the United States, where there is a lobbying law, and the Russian Federation, where there is no such a law. We considered the resonant Build Back Better Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, both introduced as part of Joe Biden’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, and Social Gasification Act, voted as part of Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly. The influence of corporate lobbyists on the consideration of these initiatives was proven. While maintaining traditional ties with the Republican Party, U.S. fuel and energy corporations are establishing parallel contacts with representatives of the Democratic Party. The success of this tactics is confirmed by the profits of fuel and energy corporations, which were growing even against the backdrop of the “green” agenda of the ruling Democrats in Congress and the White House before the 2024 elections. In Russia, corporate interest in the high-monopolized fuel and energy sector is merging with state interest, de facto involving the president, the government and the both houses of parliament leaders in lobbying for the gas monopoly. The efforts of Russian lobbyists are concentrated not in parliament, but to a greater extent in the executive authorities, and thus bills introduced on behalf of the government may have lobbying potential, which is also evident in the example of the Social Gasification Act.

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Publication Details

Journal
World Economy and International Relations
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2025-69-5-109-120
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Corporate Lobbying in Parliament: Operationalization and Assessment PossibilitiesExemplified by USA and Russia

G. A. Borshchevskiy
World Economy and International Relations
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
article

Corporate Lobbying in Parliament: Operationalization and Assessment PossibilitiesExemplified by USA and Russia

G. A. Borshchevskiy
article en

Abstract

Lobbying studies are common in political science and economics, but only a few works are devoted to assessing a bill’s lobbying potential. Empirical verification of theoretical judgments seems to be a logical continuation of discussions on lobbying. This article proposes a tool for assessing the lobbying potential of legislative initiatives, tested on real cases: a methodology combining quantitative and qualitative indicators, official and expert data. We tested it using comparative legal and statistical analysis, and expert estimations for two national cases: the United States, where there is a lobbying law, and the Russian Federation, where there is no such a law. We considered the resonant Build Back Better Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, both introduced as part of Joe Biden’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, and Social Gasification Act, voted as part of Vladimir Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly. The influence of corporate lobbyists on the consideration of these initiatives was proven. While maintaining traditional ties with the Republican Party, U.S. fuel and energy corporations are establishing parallel contacts with representatives of the Democratic Party. The success of this tactics is confirmed by the profits of fuel and energy corporations, which were growing even against the backdrop of the “green” agenda of the ruling Democrats in Congress and the White House before the 2024 elections. In Russia, corporate interest in the high-monopolized fuel and energy sector is merging with state interest, de facto involving the president, the government and the both houses of parliament leaders in lobbying for the gas monopoly. The efforts of Russian lobbyists are concentrated not in parliament, but to a greater extent in the executive authorities, and thus bills introduced on behalf of the government may have lobbying potential, which is also evident in the example of the Social Gasification Act.

World Economy and International RelationsVol. 69(5)
The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RU)
Openalex Percentile: Top 85%
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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