Integrating inferentialism and representationalism: Kant’s synthesis thesis, normative ceilings, and phenomenological data

During Kant’s time, the fusion of mathematics and empirical research – pioneered by figures like Newton – was reshaping how conclusions about nature were drawn. Kant had to grapple with the question of how such validation depends on the logical frameworks and rationality standards used to structure scientific demonstrations. With the fading reliance on metaphysical principles to establish such standards, this article positions Kant’s theory of synthesis as a pivotal response to these philosophical challenges, foreshadowing theses on how representational systems model and structure phenomena. A substantial part of Kant’s strategy involved reconciling the inferential and representational dimensions of knowledge. The article will show how Kant’s transcendental logic, Fodor’s Language of Thought, and Husserl’s formal ontologies collectively address the specification of non-extensional content by bridging conceptual mediators, representational structures, and grounded genus-species relationships. We then argue that without linking the formal specification of intensional cognitive processes to a normative theory of higher-order contents, and a theory of science and epistemology, the program remains incomplete. In chapter three, we delve into the debate with naturalist reductions of intentionality (Dennett) and with phenomenological and Hegelian perspectives, emphasizing normative, reflective, and intersubjective frameworks that shape cognition and its alignment with scientific paradigms and cultural norms. We conclude that Kant’s thesis of a priori syntheses anchors problematic representations within possible experience, offering a dynamic framework for scientific self-consciousness and judgment certainty, bringing forth phenomenological data conditioned by a normative ceiling.