Beyond Repeat Players: Judicial Suggestions for Tech Giants and Relational Governance in Chinese Courts

Abstract Observing the high compliance rates of tech giants with judicial suggestions from Internet courts in China, this article supplements Galanter’s thesis by reconsidering the extent to which repeat players inherently dominate litigation outcomes over one-shotters. Drawing from theories of relational contracts and governance, it proposes a theory of relational adjudication that not only explains the compliance phenomenon but also offers new insights into the high success rates of repeat players. This theory suggests that courts, acting as “repeat referees,” leverage long-term interactions to encourage greater compliance and improve litigation outcomes among these players. Central to this cooperative dynamic are reciprocal expectations and frequent information exchanges. Contrary to traditional views, within a relational governance framework, court intervention extends beyond case-by-case decisions to include systematic compliance advice, thereby integrating legal risk prevention into daily corporate practices. However, potential drawbacks such as risks to judicial credibility and integrity warrant careful consideration.