Cooperative behavior of the global oil market participants under sanctions restrictions

Subject. The article discusses the competition and cooperation of the global oil market participants in the context of a ban on the part of a group of consumer countries to buy oil from a large producer. Objectives. The aims are to develop tools for oil market research, identify possible options for cooperation between market participants to stabilize the market under a total embargo on the purchase of oil from one of the producers. Methods. The study employs the game-theoretical modeling of the global oil market, comparative analysis of two trading options, i.e. the sale of oil on the commodity exchange and under private contracts between individual large sellers and buyers. Results. The paper presents a game-theoretical model where players are both producers and consumers of oil; identifies critical parameters of the market caused by the embargo on the purchase of oil from one of the producers; defines possibilities of cooperation between producers and consumers aimed at achieving a stable state of the oil market, and the characteristics of possible equilibrium states under the embargo. Conclusions. The developed model can be used for studying the current state of the global oil market under sanctions restrictions. An effective means of stabilizing this market under an embargo on the purchase of oil from one of the producers is a combination of cooperation between producers to form a joint supply of oil when it is sold on the stock exchange and their cooperation with consumers in determining contract parameters for over-the-counter trading.