Scarf’s Algorithm and Stable Marriages

Scarf’s algorithm gives a pivoting procedure to find a special vertex—a dominating vertex—in a down-monotone polytope. This paper studies the behavior of Scarf’s algorithm when employed to find stable matchings in bipartite graphs. First, it proves that Scarf’s algorithm can be implemented to run in polynomial time, showing the first positive result on its runtime in significant settings. Second, it shows an infinite family of instances where, no matter the pivoting rule and runtime, Scarf’s algorithm outputs a matching from an exponentially small subset of all stable matchings, thus showing a structural weakness of the approach. Funding: This work was supported by the Division of Computing and Communication Foundations [Grant 2046146]: An algorithmic theory of matching markets and the Meta Research Award to Y. Faenza and C. He.

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Publication Details

Journal
Mathematics of Operations Research
Published
2025-05-15
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.0055
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Scarf’s Algorithm and Stable Marriages

Jay Sethuraman, Chengyue He, Yuri Faenza
Mathematics of Operations Research
Game Theory and Voting Systems
article

Scarf’s Algorithm and Stable Marriages

Jay Sethuraman, Chengyue He, Yuri Faenza
article en

Abstract

Scarf’s algorithm gives a pivoting procedure to find a special vertex—a dominating vertex—in a down-monotone polytope. This paper studies the behavior of Scarf’s algorithm when employed to find stable matchings in bipartite graphs. First, it proves that Scarf’s algorithm can be implemented to run in polynomial time, showing the first positive result on its runtime in significant settings. Second, it shows an infinite family of instances where, no matter the pivoting rule and runtime, Scarf’s algorithm outputs a matching from an exponentially small subset of all stable matchings, thus showing a structural weakness of the approach. Funding: This work was supported by the Division of Computing and Communication Foundations [Grant 2046146]: An algorithmic theory of matching markets and the Meta Research Award to Y. Faenza and C. He.

Mathematics of Operations Research
Columbia University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 85%
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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