An Incentive Mechanism for Motivating Industrial Loads to Participate in the Power Guarantee Supply-Coordinated Operation of Power Grid
With the surge in industrial load and renewable energy, the power grid is facing a huge pressure to ensure power supply. Since the industrial loads have a certain flexibility, how to motivate them to participate in the coordinated operation of power grid is essential to the power guarantee supply. In this paper, an incentive mechanism and a power source-load coordinated model are proposed to motivate the industrial loads to participate in the coordinated operation of power grid. The incentive mechanism and coordinated operation is proposed based on the Nash bargaining method, which can be equivalent to the total operation cost minimization operation sub-problem and the profit allocation sub-problem. Simulation results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed model in power guarantee supply, and motivating the industrial loads to participate the coordinated operation, the operation cost of industrial load can be significantly reduced by 22.37%.
Authors
- Di Ge (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4568-7830)
- Xinhe Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0238-9729)
- Haiyang Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2736-6611)
- Guodong Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0398-6373)
- Junfeng Qu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9102-7529)
- Lai Ma (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0997-3605)
- Zhifei Cai
Institutions
- Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
- Institute of Electrical Engineering (CN)
- Xuchang University (CN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-11-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ei264398.2024.10991767
- Primary Topic
- Power Systems and Renewable Energy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China