Farm-Bloc Federalism: The Rise, Fall (and Rise Again?) of a Constitutional Coalition

Constitutional doctrines are tools for political parties as well as courts. Courts use such doctrines to guide judicial review by providing stability and predictability in judicial decisions. Political parties use constitutional doctrines in an analogous way to achieve partisan stabil-ity by holding together coalitions of interests that might otherwise fall apart. This article explores this use of constitutional doctrine to achieve coalitional stability, by examining how, between 1832 and 1932, poli-ticians repeatedly attempted to use federalism doctrine to bridge divides within their parties, with varying degrees of success. The Dem-ocratic Party initially succeeded in uniting a “farm bloc” coalition through federalism that limited federal power over banking and infra-structure. Later attempts to use federalism to resolve conflicts over slavery, cultural issues, and racial violence proved less successful. This history holds relevance today as the Republican Party considers whether constitutional federalism might help resolve internal tensions over issues like abortion and gun rights. The article concludes that fed-eralism’s effectiveness as a coalition-management tool depends on finding constitutional principles that are simultaneously clear enough to detect violations, legally plausible enough to provide political cover, and sufficiently aligned with coalition members’ practical interests and emotional needs to sustain their loyalty over time.