Pre-silicon hardware Trojan detection in mixed-signal circuits using heterogeneous graph attention networks
Detecting hardware Trojans (HTs) in mixed-signal circuits is challenging due to structural complexity and cross-domain vulnerabilities between analog and digital components. Existing methods often rely on post-silicon analysis, circuit modifications, or focus solely on leakage, limiting practicality. We propose HGAT4TJ, a pre-silicon detection approach based on heterogeneous graph attention networks, which models gate- and transistor-level structures in a unified graph. This enables effective cross-domain HT detection directly from netlists without requiring golden models. Experimental results on benchmark circuits indicate that HGAT4TJ achieves 100% detection rate at the circuit level and over 97% accuracy at the node level, making it a non-invasive solution for HT detection in mixed-signal circuits.
Authors
- Huan Guo (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7838-2585)
- Jialong Song (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-4939-9430)
- Ting Su (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2356-5322)
- Keqin Li (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5224-4048)
- Zhenyu Zhao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1041-2995)
- Xing Hu
- Yang Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7490-8343)
Institutions
- State University of New York (US)
- National University of Defense Technology (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEICE Electronics Express
- Published
- 2025-05-15
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1587/elex.22.20250237
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China