The Audit Bureau of City Y Studied the Audit of "Economic Responsibility Project of Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of City Y"

This study takes the "Economic Responsibility Audit of the Y City Human Resources and Social Security Bureau" project as an example, and analyzes the shortcomings in the economic responsibility audit process of public sectors by combining principal-agent theory, risk management theory, and power balance theory. In the examples discussed in this paper, comprehensive full-process audits have played a good supervisory role in identifying deficiencies in the legality of duties performed and the effectiveness of resource utilization during the audit process. However, we also found that this audit process still has drawbacks such as low efficiency, limited independence, incomplete systems, and talent scarcity: the risk lag due to the focus on later-stage audits; the impact of administrative affiliation on audit independence from the authority exercising administrative subordination; the weak effectiveness caused by incomplete institutional arrangements; and the inefficiency resulting from talent shortages due to scarce personnel. To address these issues, this paper proposes: first, to widely implement "audit during tenure" so that the audit process can track and grasp the leaders' performance in real time, thereby fully leveraging the early and mid-term warning functions; second, to fully utilize the vertical management system and independent funding policies to genuinely enhance the independence and practical impact of audit work; third, to further improve the standard institutional arrangements for full-process audits, making dynamic feedback and information technology-assisted operational systems more superior; fourth, to improve and refine the reward mechanism system and professional training system from both talent recruitment and talent development perspectives. From the perspective of combining theory and practice, corresponding solutions are put forward for the current situation that the efficiency of economic responsibility audit in administrative institutions is low and the governance is not standardized.