Supreme Court Influence on Political Party Agendas and Policy Development, 1952–2016

Abstract Understanding the Supreme Court's role in policy development is increasingly important because polarization and the attendant gridlock in legislatures make it an ever more attractive venue for parties and interest groups pursuing policy change. Recent work shows that although direct policymaking in the Court occurs regularly, indirect influence over subsequent policy development is far more common. Although the Court's role as a policymaker has been studied and theorized extensively, its indirect influence over policy development has received much less attention. This article contributes to the growing literature on the indirect effects of judicial decisions on policy change. First, I show that the Supreme Court frequently influences the stated agendas of national parties. Second, in four case studies, I trace policy developments subsequent to those agenda changes and, in doing so, demonstrate that agenda influence is, in fact, a key pathway of indirect policy influence by the Supreme Court.