Agency and authority: A differentiated model of hermeneutical power

Abstract According to theorists of hermeneutical injustice, how we understand our social experiences is contingent on relations of hermeneutical power: the differential ability of groups to influence social meanings. On the prevailing understanding, privileged groups enjoy more hermeneutical power, at the expense of the marginalized. This paper argues that this obscures the sense in which we can possess different kinds of hermeneutical power. While marginalized groups are often excluded from shaping dominant understandings, they often participate in hermeneutical resistance (Medina 2012). Despite their advantages with respect to shaping mainstream understanding, privileged groups often lack this kind of resistant capacity. This paper suggests that hermeneutical power consists in hermeneutical authority––the ability to shape how others understand social life––and hermeneutical agency––the ability to interpret social life for oneself. This distinction helps us map the complexities of power and social interpretation more accurately and promises a deeper understanding of hermeneutical injustice.