Why Metz’s Moral Theory Isn’t All That Relational

This paper examines what it means for something to be relational by asking whether Thaddeus Metz’s relational moral theory counts as relational. After distinguishing between two broad senses of relational––modal relationalism, on which Metz’s moral theory is grounded, and actual relationalism, which Metz’s presents as a foil, the paper goes on to argue that Metz’s moral theory is not all that relational. In particular, it motivates three claims. First, modal relationalism obscures the difference between relational and nonrelational. Second, the modal property on which modal relationalism is grounded fails to pass Metz’s own test for deciding whether or not something is relational. Third, we are not rationally compelled to go modal as Metz suggests since proponents of actual relationalism can cope with the challenges he lays at their door. The upshot is that an adequate account of relationalism must look beyond Metz’s modal capacity.