Socially Disruptive Technologies, Moral Progress, and Rule Following

Abstract One of the most ethically significant features of new and emerging 21st century technologies is their potential to disrupt the social status quo, for better or worse. Correspondingly, one of the most pressing questions in the philosophy and ethics of technology is how to understand and respond to this potential for social disruption. A prominent account of social disruption is what I call the “epistemic account,” according to which socially disruptive technologies are sources of moral-epistemic uncertainty and trigger moral inquiry into the novel circumstances they bring about and the new actions they make possible. This paper begins with a critique of the epistemic account and develops an alternative account according to which socially disruptive technologies undermine the very possibility of progressive inquiry (as opposed to simply triggering it). It continues to draw attention to an underappreciated connection between the concept of social disruption, the notion of progress through inquiry, and our capacity to “go on in the same way,” drawing on the literature surrounding Wittgenstein’s famous rule-following considerations. A picture of social disruption is sketched out – the “language-game” picture – that challenges many widespread philosophical assumptions, including the objectivity of disruptive power, the explainability and predictability of social disruption, and the justificatory status of our ethical responses to social disruption.