The Dialectic of Utility: Reconsidering Enlightenment in Hegel and Horkheimer/Adorno

Abstract In the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel places the concept of utility at the centre of his analysis of the Enlightenment period. Utility does not appear merely as a criterion of individual action, but describes a social context of mutual support, realized in a collective referred to by Hegel as a ‘troop’ ( Trupp ). In Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of a reason fixated on utility, the Hegelian image of the ‘troop’ came to symbolize a repressive equality which removes the freedom of the individual and seals the failure of enlightenment. In contrast, this article demonstrates that Hegel’s concept of utility cannot be reduced to an attitude which instrumentalizes everything and everyone. In fact, utility refers to a mode of interaction which also takes account of the heterogeneity of each individual. Drawing on Hegel and going beyond his analysis, the article develops a post-Hegelian concept of utility as a formation of social practices that neither instrumentalizes people, nor simply represents an instantiation of social freedom, but rather establishes a constitutive relation between caring for oneself and being useful to others. From this perspective, the concept of utility is not only part of the problem of enlightenment, but also contributes to the endeavour to which Adorno and Horkheimer committed themselves: to work towards an affirmative understanding of enlightenment.