Prehistorical Simultaneity—Structural Fragility of Temporality in the <i>Phenomenology of Perception</i>

梅洛庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中提出应就时间本身考虑时间，并遵循时间的内在辩证法来重铸主体观念。这一提法开辟了现象学视角下时间成为主体成立要件的可能性，时间由此成为主体须臾不可分离的构造性条件，从而展开从时间–主体结构下主体实存与世界的现象学论域。但在时间重铸主体性的同时，梅洛庞蒂并没有在论述上严格拒斥时间重铸主体性并非时间与主体关系的唯一可能性，时间与主体的先后关系在《知觉现象学》的时间性视角下仍然是未解决的，其导致了《知觉现象学》中的时间–主体结构无法反驳一种唯心主义的批评。本文试图通过在已从自足主体地位退后的互相生成关系结构中，无法在逻辑上确立究竟是时间重铸了主体还是相反，揭示出《知觉现象学》时间性结构的脆弱根源在于，时间–主体结构同世界的互相生成关系预设了作为共根——时间–主体结构与世界的互相生成的源初“同时性”(Prehistorical Simultaneity)——的“类时间”(Temporality-analogous)结构，这一类时间结构无法以此作为过渡综合的“时间性”解释。这使追问时间与主体关系的逻辑可能性问题转变为向上追溯时间–主体结构与世界的存在论依据问题，并由此显现出从时间性通往存在论根据的必然性道路。In the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty proposes that time should be considered in terms of time itself and that the concept of the subject should be recast in accordance with the internal dialectic of time. This proposal opens up the possibility of time becoming an essential element for the establishment of the subject from a phenomenological perspective, and time thus becomes an indispensable constructive condition for the subject, thus opening up a phenomenological discourse on the subject’s existence and the world under the structure of time-subject. However, while time recasts subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty does not strictly reject that time recasts subjectivity is not the only possibility of the relation between time and the subject, and that the sequential relation between time and the subject remains unresolved under the temporal perspective of the Phenomenology of Perception, which leads to the criticism that the temporal-subjective structure of the Phenomenology of Perception is unable to refute a kind of idealism. By failing to logically establish whether time recasts the subject or vice versa in a structure of mutually generative relations that has receded from the status of the self-sufficient subject, this paper attempts to reveal that the source of the fragility of the temporal structure of the Phenomenology of Perception lies in the fact that the mutually generative relation of the time-subject structure to the world presupposes as a co-root - the time-subject. The intergenerative relationship between the time-subject structure and the world presupposes a “temporality-analog” as the common root—the Prehistorical Simultaneity of the intergeneration of the time-subject structure and the world. Temporality-analogous structure, which cannot be explained by “temporality” as a transitional synthesis. This transforms the question of the logical possibility of tracing the relation between time and subject into the question of the existential ground of the time-subject structure and the world, and thus reveals the inevitable path from temporality to the existential ground.