Workplace Networks and Political Selection

Abstract Do social networks at workplaces function as cues into the political arena? We consider this question using the case of Sweden, which has many leisure politicians who work in the regular labour market. Restricting our networks to small cells of individuals within the same occupation and workplace, we find that an individual is more likely to become a politician in the future if that person has a colleague who was a politician. We further find that these newly enrolled individuals are placed higher up on the party lists – which to a very large extent dictates which party nominees are elected – in subsequent elections. Our mechanism analysis indicates that the effect is stronger if we consider political party bloc networks and that high-ability party officials are more prominent than low-ability officials in terms of recruiting from their workplace networks.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
British Journal of Political Science
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123425000067
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Social Policy and Reform Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
8.52
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Workplace Networks and Political Selection

Henrik Andersson, Linuz Aggeborn
1 citations
British Journal of Political Science
Social Policy and Reform Studies
8.52
article

Workplace Networks and Political Selection

Henrik Andersson, Linuz Aggeborn
article en
1 citations

Abstract

Abstract Do social networks at workplaces function as cues into the political arena? We consider this question using the case of Sweden, which has many leisure politicians who work in the regular labour market. Restricting our networks to small cells of individuals within the same occupation and workplace, we find that an individual is more likely to become a politician in the future if that person has a colleague who was a politician. We further find that these newly enrolled individuals are placed higher up on the party lists – which to a very large extent dictates which party nominees are elected – in subsequent elections. Our mechanism analysis indicates that the effect is stronger if we consider political party bloc networks and that high-ability party officials are more prominent than low-ability officials in terms of recruiting from their workplace networks.

British Journal of Political ScienceVol. 55
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Social Policy and Reform Studies
8.52
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.