Author’s Response

Cochrane presses me to clarify my position about animal citizenship.He says that I leave essential questions unclear, in particular whether citizenship belongs only to companion animals or also to wild animals.Actually, my position on this matter is utterly clear, though at a high level of generality.Chapters 5 and 12 argue that all sentient animals are subjects of the "virtual constitution" supplied by the capabilities norms for each species, and therefore all have rights that must be legally enforced.My argument for rights follows .I later conclude: "Rights and law, I argued in chapter 5, are conceptually interdependent.And rights mean that, where those structures do not yet exist, all humans, having the monopoly of lawmaking in this world, have a collective duty to create them as best we can" (279).If to have enforceable rights is to be a citizen, then all sentient animals are citizens.Whose citizens?A rough answer is, "Citizens of our world."And this ironclad commitment of mine makes clear the fact that I firmly reject the exclusion of wild animals from citizenship proposed by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka.But, as I go on to say, going further presents huge practical problems, especially given the weakness and inadequacy of international treaty law as it presently exists (for humans too).The CA is a theory about defensible goals, not (for humans either) a theory of political structure.There is a division of labor, and I do not feel ready to offer a knock-down argument for or against the nation state as a site of justice, although I believe that Grotius is correct: It is the largest existing entity that gives autonomy to creatures (autonomy being defined as self-given law), and that is responsive to the voices of the affected.All forms of international