Game-On: Game Theory Strategies to Mitigate On-Off Attacks in Fog Computing

In the rapidly evolving digital landscape, the integration of fog computing introduces unique cybersecurity challenges, particularly with regard to on-off attacks characterized by intermittent bursts of malicious activity. These attacks pose significant risks to organizations utilizing distributed computing architectures, as traditional static defense mechanisms often prove inadequate in such dynamic environments. This paper presents a novel game-theoretic model designed specifically for mitigating on-off attacks in fog computing contexts. By framing the cybersecurity scenario as a non-cooperative game, we analyze the strategic interactions between attackers and defenders across distributed nodes. The model incorporates various defender strategies, including low, medium, and high defense levels, along with attacker strategies of initiating attacks or remaining passive. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies and their respective impacts on the players’ payoffs. Our findings reveal that adaptive defensive strategies significantly improve the defender’s success while reducing the attacker’s effectiveness. Notably, the high-defense strategy consistently yields superior outcomes for defenders in fog environments, demonstrating its efficacy against aggressive on-off attack patterns. These results highlight the importance of employing game theory to develop dynamic defense mechanisms in fog computing, providing critical insights for organizations aiming to bolster their cybersecurity posture against evolving threats.