The Hermeneutic Cycle in <i>Being and Time</i>

海德格尔在《存在与时间》中提出了“诠释学循环”的概念，这一概念基于海氏对此在的生存论分析而得出，明确了理解具有不可避免的“前结构”，所有的解释都活动在一种预设好的领会中，无法脱离“先入之见”的影响。全面地理解海德格尔的诠释学循环思想，需要溯源哲学史上的循环概念，看到他是对哪个循环问题的回应。并通过海德格尔诠释学与存在论的深刻关联揭示其诠释学循环的生存论基础，明确海德格尔之所以能够回应作为认识论问题的“循环论证”的原因。最后还需将眼光拓展到后世诠释学的发展，认识到海德格尔诠释学循环概念的本体论特性在带来突破的同时，也有方法论上的缺陷。In Being and Time, Heidegger puts forward the concept of “hermeneutic cycle”, which is based on Heidegger’s existential analysis of this being, and makes it clear that understanding has an unavoidable “pre-structure”, and that all interpretations are active in a kind of preconceived apprehension, which cannot be separated from the good apprehension. It is clear that understanding has an inescapable “pre-structure” and that all interpretations are active in a preconceived apprehension, which cannot be separated from the influence of “preconceptions”. A comprehensive understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutic of circularity requires tracing the concept of circularity in the history of philosophy to see which circular problem he is responding to. And through the deep connection between Heidegger’s hermeneutics and existentialism, the existential basis of his hermeneutic cycle should be revealed, and the reason why Heidegger can respond to the “circular argument” as an epistemological problem should be clarified. Finally, it is necessary to expand the perspective to the development of hermeneutics in later times, and to realize that the ontological character of Heidegger’s hermeneutic cycle concept brings a breakthrough, but also has methodological defects.