Indeterminate Meaning: A Temporally Extended Radical Conventionalism of Rule-Following

Abstract The rule-following paradox represents one of the most fundamental forms of skepticism, as it suggests the impossibility of possessing any intentional content. Despite numerous solutions proposed since Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, a definitive resolution remains elusive. This suggests that some commonsense notions regarding rules or semantic content may need to be reconsidered. Some commentators advocate abandoning the conception of absolute determinacy in meaning, which holds that every logically possible application is definitively right or wrong. There are countless possible instances of the application of rules, but as finite beings, we cannot classify every one of them as either right or wrong. Embracing this perspective, I defend a version of radical conventionalism, asserting that whenever practitioners agree on the specific steps for applying expressions, their agreement establishes both rules and semantic facts. A common objection to this idea is that it fails to account for the possibility of errors because we might agree on incorrect points or disagree on correct ones. To address this objection, I propose that semantic facts could be determined retrospectively; subsequent practices institute the semantic facts about their antecedent practices by refining and overriding the semantic facts established in the past. Semantic facts are essentially indeterminate because the application of expressions without agreement in practice is neither correct nor incorrect; however, they are historically determinable.