Dewey, Naturalism and Moral Inquiry

Philosophical naturalists who stress that moral issues are addressed through the use of empirical methods have faced a  seemingly insurmountable problem. While science may provide the explanatory means to address certain problems, it fails to be  of use with the selection of those ends worth pursuing. Moreover, such normative questions are irreducibly first person, where  one must provide reasons for the decision to act in a specific way. No scientific explanation about what is the case can, by itself, stand as a reason why someone should decide on a course of action. This article discusses Dewey's response to this type of  challenge with his conception of moral deliberation as continuous with scientific inquiry. It focuses on his 1915 attempt to  isolate the nature of what he calls 'practical judgments' explaining how he views them as basic elements of inquiry. This  demonstrates that Dewey accepts that normative questions cannot be replaced in favor of scientific descriptions. However, he  further suggests that we question the logical distinctness assigned to these two types of questions. Understanding how  experimental forms of reasoning can be extended to moral deliberation requires a proper appreciation of the place of practical  judgment within inquiry more generally.