Trained to rebel: Rebel leaders’ military training and the dynamics of civil conflicts

Abstract Rebel leaders can prolong civil wars. Although past research has examined how rebel groups have shaped civil wars, little attention has been paid to rebel leaders. I argue that civil wars last longer and are less likely to be terminated in government-favorable outcomes when rebel leaders with training in a nonstate armed group are in charge, in contrast to leaders with no training or state military service. Nonstate training makes leaders more capable of continuing the conflict with few weapons and resources and more willing to persevere because of their combatant socialization. The rebel leaders trained in creativity and perseverance are more likely to make strategic choices that heighten bargaining challenges and the risk of bargaining failure thus leading to longer wars. I test propositions through a quantitative analysis of all rebel leaders in civil conflicts from 1989 to 2015. The analysis is supplemented with a qualitative discussion based on personal interviews with top-level leaders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.