Developing cognition from its original seeds: Kant's conception of the synthetic method in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>

Abstract In the Prolegomena , Kant contrasts the synthetic procedure employed in the Critique of Pure Reason with the analytic procedure carried out in the Prolegomena itself. Given the tangle of analyses, arguments, and alleged proofs that make up the Critique itself, however, it is hard to relate Kant's remarks on the method to the way he actually proceeds in this work. Unlike Merritt and Gava, among others, I argue that Kant's innovative use of the synthetic method consists not in the unification of two previously separated elements, but in the act of generating a sum total of cognitions without relying on anything given. Even though Kant in the Critique does not proceed synthetically in all regards, he arguably develops sets of synthetic a priori cognitions from a consideration of the functions of the pure understanding and pure reason per se. I support this reading by clarifying in which sense Kant actually proceeds synthetically in the Doctrine of Elements, in particular as regards his derivation of the synthetic a priori judgments generated by the pure understanding and pure reason. In the latter context, I focus on Kant's metaphysical deductions of the categories and the ideas of pure reason on which these judgments are based.