Digital Governance in a Rubber Band: Structural Constraints in Governing a Global Digital Economy

Abstract The United States, the European Union, and China are often portrayed as representing three competing models of digital governance. Their so-called market, democratic, and authoritarian approach supposedly reflects their respective preferences over which actors should control the development and use of digital technologies. We argue that more than representing different preferences, each model differs in how it resolves inherent tensions associated with governing a digital economy in a global context. When devising new digital policies, jurisdictions must navigate tensions between achieving three policy objectives: maintaining regulatory autonomy, promoting market competitiveness, and supporting open and interoperable digital ecosystems. Significantly, the more they push to achieve one or more of these objectives, the harder it becomes to pursue the other(s), reflecting what we call a “rubber band” effect. We use this argument to make sense of changes in the digital policy in each jurisdiction, highlighting in the process their greater dynamism than often assumed.