The limits of Brexit prejudice

Abstract Since the Brexit referendum, two novel political identities, Leaver and Remainer, have gained political salience in the United Kingdom. Some work contends that Leavers and Remainers display great animus toward one another in ways similar to affective polarization (dislike of opposing partisans). However, it remains unclear whether the dislike is as deep as partisan affective polarization and whether these identities are still relevant several years after Brexit. Additionally, it is not known whether Brexit‐related animus is based more on in‐group favoritism or out‐group dislike. Using a survey experiment paradigm to assess different levels of prejudice (based on pre‐registered hypotheses), we find clear prejudice based on Brexit identity in 2019 that is almost unchanged in 2023. Both in‐group favoritism and out‐group animus appear to drive these tendencies, but out‐group animus's effects are more robust. Leavers and Remainers have different motivations for different manifestations of prejudice, but each displays both tendencies at times.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Political Psychology
Published
2025-05-10
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.70037
Primary Topic
Migration, Refugees, and Integration
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

The limits of Brexit prejudice

Joseph Phillips, Florian Stoeckel
Political Psychology
Migration, Refugees, and Integration
article

The limits of Brexit prejudice

Joseph Phillips, Florian Stoeckel
article en

Abstract

Abstract Since the Brexit referendum, two novel political identities, Leaver and Remainer, have gained political salience in the United Kingdom. Some work contends that Leavers and Remainers display great animus toward one another in ways similar to affective polarization (dislike of opposing partisans). However, it remains unclear whether the dislike is as deep as partisan affective polarization and whether these identities are still relevant several years after Brexit. Additionally, it is not known whether Brexit‐related animus is based more on in‐group favoritism or out‐group dislike. Using a survey experiment paradigm to assess different levels of prejudice (based on pre‐registered hypotheses), we find clear prejudice based on Brexit identity in 2019 that is almost unchanged in 2023. Both in‐group favoritism and out‐group animus appear to drive these tendencies, but out‐group animus's effects are more robust. Leavers and Remainers have different motivations for different manifestations of prejudice, but each displays both tendencies at times.

Political PsychologyVol. 47(1)
University of Exeter (GB), Cardiff University (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 87%
Migration, Refugees, and Integration
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

The limits of Brexit prejudice — Joseph Phillips, Florian Stoeckel · Political Psychology (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS