Moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games

We report on two experiments (total N=2,572) testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. In the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder’s minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share, while the responder gets nothing. Study 1 is correlational and explores how moral preferences, as measured using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, explain behaviour in the two games. Study 2 is causal and investigates the effect of moral suasion on behaviour. Regarding proposers, both studies provide evidence that moral preferences affect offers more in the impunity game than in the ultimatum game. For responders, Study 1 shows that moral preferences explain behaviour similarly in both games, while Study 2 demonstrates that moral suasion influences behaviour more strongly in the impunity game. Exploratory analyses of the binding and individualizing dimensions help reconcile these results. Our findings shed light on the complex relationship between moral preferences and behaviour in ultimatum and impunity games. • We examine the effect of moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games. • We find that moral preferences are positively associated with proposers’ offers in the impunity game, but not in the ultimatum game. • Moral preferences are positively associated with responders’ minimum acceptable offers in both games. • Additional analyses indicate that moral preferences beyond monetary payoffs can explain the behavior of proposers and responders.