Experimental Viability of Full-Frame 5G Meaconing Attacks

This demo paper experimentally explores the feasibility of full-frame meaconing attacks in 5th generation (5G) systems, wherein adversaries stealthily manipulate time-of-arrival (ToA) measurements without disrupting ongoing communications. By intercepting, delaying, and amplifying the entire 5G frames, including critical positioning signals from the gNodeB (gNB), the attack injects a bias into the ToA estimation process, leading to significant positioning errors while leaving the communication service uninterrupted. Our evaluation, conducted on a comprehensive end-to-end 5G testbed built with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and Software-Defined Radio (SDR) devices, includes real-time monitoring of key performance metrics such as reference signal received power (RSRP) and signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR). The experimental results highlight a critical physical-layer vulnerability in 5G positioning, underscoring the urgent need for robust countermeasures to safeguard network integrity.