Comment on ‘‘RIO: Return Instruction Obfuscation for Bare-Metal IoT Devices’’
This is a comment on "RIO: Return Instruction Obfuscation for Bare-Metal IoT Devices". RIO prevents finding gadgets for return-oriented programming attacks by encrypting return instructions. This paper shows flaws in the design of RIO that allow for the easy retrieval of the plaintext return instructions without decrypting them. Additionally, changes are proposed to improve upon the original idea.
Authors
- Peter Langendöerfer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6209-9048)
- Kai Lehniger (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3274-2469)
Institutions
- Leibniz Institute for Neurobiology (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2025.3568598
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00