Nuclear Latency: Janus-Faced Consequences of US Political Influence for Protégés’ Nuclear Capability

Abstract What explains the variation in the level of latent nuclear capabilities between different countries over time? Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of deterrence. It seems appealing for countries to achieve a high level of nuclear capability to be able to produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time. However, there is a wide variation in the nuclear capabilities of different countries. What explains this pattern? I argue in this paper that the effect of US political and military influence vis-à-vis its protégé is an essential factor in determining the level of nuclear capabilities in protégés. In particular, the effect of the United States’ political and military tools on the future level of the protégé’s nuclear capability would be conditional on the current level of the protégé’s nuclear capability. While the United States’ political and military tools initially serve to bolster the protégé’s nuclear capability by enhancing deterrence against a preventive attack from a regional adversary, it eventually works to suppress the development of the protégé’s nuclear capability as it becomes increasingly advanced. This paper highlights how the United States’ political and military tools function in determining the protégés’ latent nuclear capabilities and provides important implications for the question of nuclear proliferation.