Dynamic interplay for blockchain-smart contracts (SC) adoption among government, private owners and general contractors across stages of contract development

Purpose Despite the well-documented benefits of blockchain-smart contracts (SC), the effective adoption among the coordination of key stakeholders remains unclear. Limited studies have considered the perspective from complex interactions of key stakeholders for different stages of contract development during the SC adoption process. Therefore, this research developed a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the dynamic interplay among government, private owners and general contractors for SC adoption across contract development stages. Design/methodology/approach Resorting to evolutionary game theory, this study develops a theoretical model grounded on the strategic interactions between government and construction stakeholders from the different sectors, whose co-evolving choices influence (and are influenced by) different SC policies. Key factors were numerically modeled their decision-making for each contract stage. This study further examines incentive subsidies, supervision costs and penalties for the key stakeholders. Findings The results reveal the choice of SC adoption strategy is influenced by the different interactive behaviors of participants across contract development stages, revealing a complex interplay where the likelihood of private owners’ development strategies inversely affects government promotion and positively influences general contractors’ application of SC. Originality/value The research contributes to the effective adoption of SC through clarifying key stakeholders’ interactions from the perspectives of distinct evolutionary stages in contract development and government interventions in the decision-making process.