Corruption networks and anti-corruption mechanisms: the case of Kenya

Purpose This paper explores how strong corruption networks, consisting of members of the Kenyan political elite, senior bureaucrats and their corporate cronies, work around anti-corruption mechanisms and render them ineffective. Design/methodology/approach We collect and analyse our data using multiple methods, including field interviews, direct observations and archival data from various sources. Findings Corruption persists in Kenya largely because of the lack of political will at various levels to operationalise proactive anti-corruption measures. Furthermore, the deeply entrenched sociocultural expectations and weak public sector governance structures give rise to inadequate transparency and accountability, resulting in more significant opportunities for corruption. Practical implications Undoubtedly, winning the fight against corruption in any setting (Africa or otherwise) requires strong political will. The fight against corruption needs a policy shift, with more emphasis on reactive anti-corruption mechanisms such as raids and surveillance, which again requires a strong political will. We propose that future research energies can be directed at understanding how political will in fighting corruption can be enhanced in sub-Saharan Africa. Originality/value We extend the literature on corruption by presenting a strong case that shows that enacting anti-corruption laws and regulations alone is not enough to eradicate corruption. We provide insights into how strong corruption networks can impede government programs and legitimise questionable practices that allow network members to make substantial private gains at the expense of the general population in an African setting.