A responsibilist account of knowledge
Abstract This paper argues for a responsibilist account of knowledge: S knows that p iff S believes the truth that p (rather than one of the alternatives to p) because S forms/retains the belief in a way that is ultima facie epistemically responsible. This account implies that knowing that p requires neither having evidence that favors p over ∼p, nor possessing reliabilist virtues, nor exhibiting responsibilist virtues or motives.
Authors
- Xingming Hu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6967-2177)
Institutions
- Nanjing University (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- The Philosophical Quarterly
- Published
- 2025-05-07
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf041
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00