Why do countries invest in geological investigations for minerals? A comparative analysis of contrasting outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda

• There is significant variation in African countries’ commitment to invest in geological investigations. • Ghana’s competitive clientelism disincentivises ruling elites from pursuing long-term investments in geological mapping. • Rwanda’s developmental coalition has prioritised geological investments albeit constrained conflicting priorities. • The paper shows how power configurations and political incentives shape investment in geological mapping. • Elite vulnerability, competing incentives, and ideas shape whether countries prioritise investment in geological investigations. Several resource-rich developing countries still have insufficient knowledge of their domestic mineral deposits and have not made sufficient investments in geological surveys. The political geography literature has highlighted how geological investigations form part of a government’s repertoire to extend three-dimensional control over territories. Yet there are few studies – particularly, of African countries – that examine why some countries may invest in geological surveys more than others. This paper adopts a political economy lens to investigate why the Rwandan government has invested more than the Ghanaian government in geological surveys. We combine insights from political settlements analysis (PSA) and the political geography literature to unpack the political economy dynamics underpinning the decisions to invest in geological mapping. Our findings suggest that Ghanaian politics has been characterised by consistent competition between political parties, which have hindered the capacity of ruling elites to maximise control over their territories through prioritising geological mapping. In contrast, Rwanda’s cohesive ruling party has prioritised investing in geological surveys because maximising control over territory is central to preserving its rule. The Rwandan case also highlights how goals of maximising control over subterranean territory, which require long-term investments, are hindered because of conflicting priorities. Instead, Rwanda’s structural vulnerabilities, as well as the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front’s material incentives and conflicting ideological goals, result in the prioritisation of trading DRC’s minerals rather than investing in its own domestic minerals sector.

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Publication Details

Journal
Geoforum
Published
2025-05-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2025.104300
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Mining and Resource Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.01
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article

Why do countries invest in geological investigations for minerals? A comparative analysis of contrasting outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda

Gerald Emmanuel Arhin, Pritish Behuria
2 citations
Geoforum
Mining and Resource Management
2.01
article

Why do countries invest in geological investigations for minerals? A comparative analysis of contrasting outcomes in Ghana and Rwanda

Gerald Emmanuel Arhin, Pritish Behuria
article en
2 citations

Abstract

• There is significant variation in African countries’ commitment to invest in geological investigations. • Ghana’s competitive clientelism disincentivises ruling elites from pursuing long-term investments in geological mapping. • Rwanda’s developmental coalition has prioritised geological investments albeit constrained conflicting priorities. • The paper shows how power configurations and political incentives shape investment in geological mapping. • Elite vulnerability, competing incentives, and ideas shape whether countries prioritise investment in geological investigations. Several resource-rich developing countries still have insufficient knowledge of their domestic mineral deposits and have not made sufficient investments in geological surveys. The political geography literature has highlighted how geological investigations form part of a government’s repertoire to extend three-dimensional control over territories. Yet there are few studies – particularly, of African countries – that examine why some countries may invest in geological surveys more than others. This paper adopts a political economy lens to investigate why the Rwandan government has invested more than the Ghanaian government in geological surveys. We combine insights from political settlements analysis (PSA) and the political geography literature to unpack the political economy dynamics underpinning the decisions to invest in geological mapping. Our findings suggest that Ghanaian politics has been characterised by consistent competition between political parties, which have hindered the capacity of ruling elites to maximise control over their territories through prioritising geological mapping. In contrast, Rwanda’s cohesive ruling party has prioritised investing in geological surveys because maximising control over territory is central to preserving its rule. The Rwandan case also highlights how goals of maximising control over subterranean territory, which require long-term investments, are hindered because of conflicting priorities. Instead, Rwanda’s structural vulnerabilities, as well as the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front’s material incentives and conflicting ideological goals, result in the prioritisation of trading DRC’s minerals rather than investing in its own domestic minerals sector.

GeoforumVol. 163
University of Manchester (GB), University College London (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 15%
Mining and Resource Management
2.01
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