Expressive lies

In this paper, I argue that cases involving expressive language prompt us to reconsider the need of three key features figuring in recent definitions of lying: assertion, belief and truth-evaluability. I assume that sentences including expressive language should be given an expressivist treatment, and I argue that such sentences can plausibly be used to lie. The main aim of this paper is to propose a revised definition of lying. Based on the resources available to two different expressivist views, I propose two ways to revise recent definitions of lying. While the first proposal results in a minimally revised definition that merely expands the notion of content but otherwise largely preserves all three key features of recent definitions of lying, the second proposal diverges more radically from recent definitions of lying. This second proposal that I call ‘the attitude expression analysis’ shows us something unexpected about lying, namely that the crucial feature of lying is a mismatch between attitudes held by the speaker and how the speaker presents herself in speech rather than the assertion of a propositional content the speaker believes to be false.