Moral precaution and the limits of knowledge: A reply to Coggon

It is widely assumed in the bioethical literature that the existence of any absolute moral principle depends on the ability of moral intuition to be in line with metaphysical reality. It is further assumed by many that we have shared access to (at least some) core moral intuitions and shared knowledge by which we can easily identify most (or even all) humans as possessing incontestable moral status. According to these assumptions, debate over moral status only needs to address the status of entities such as non-human animals and human embryos. We have previously argued that Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) is the supreme principle of morality (indeed, of all practical reasoning) and requires no such assumptions, but its application requires a particular type of moral precaution when identifying whom/what beyond oneself is to be granted moral status. John Coggon argues that our ‘moral precautionary thesis’ is incapable of dealing with the ‘metaphysical and epistemological’ challenges that underpin the problem of other minds, which he therefore dismisses as a ‘mistaken starting point’. In this article, we argue that Coggon has not fully appreciated his own assumptions and what is implied by recognition of the PGC as the categorical imperative.